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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 16-4322
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ADOLPHUS NWOKEDI,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-15-cr-00177-001)
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 7, 2017
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: September 11, 2017)
____________
OPINION*
____________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
After a jury convicted him of conspiracy to import heroin into the United States in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, Adolphus Nwokedi filed this appeal claiming he was
entitled to a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Because we are unpersuaded by any of
Nwokedi’s arguments, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I1
Nwokedi first insists that his conviction cannot stand because the Government
acted in bad faith. In support of this claim, Nwokedi cites the Government’s destruction
of evidence (the heroin) and its failure to record his confession.
Nwokedi’s bad faith claim, which implicates “a defect in instituting the
prosecution,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A), fails for at least two reasons. For starters,
Rule 12 requires such claims to be raised before trial and we cannot consider untimely
claims absent “good cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3); see also United States v.
Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2014). Although Nwokedi knew prior to trial
that the heroin was destroyed, he neither raised the issue in the District Court nor has he
argued on appeal that good cause existed for his failure to do so. Accordingly, we hold
this claim forfeited.2

1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our
jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

Even had Nwokedi timely objected, his bad faith argument would have failed.
We have no per se rule requiring confessions to be recorded, United States v. Tykarsky,
2

Articulating a variation on his first theme, Nwokedi argues that the destruction of
the heroin and the absence of a recorded confession rendered the evidence insufficient to
support his conviction. This argument runs headlong into the seminal precedent of United
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, where this Court explained that our review of sufficiency
claims is “highly deferential” to the jury’s findings, even in “drug conspiracy cases.” 726
F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). We may reverse only when “no reasonable juror
could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 430–31 (citation omitted).
Although the jury was free to believe Nwokedi’s testimony that he never
confessed, the jury was equally free to find the agent’s testimony to the contrary more
credible. Nor was it irrational for the jury to find Nwokedi guilty based on the
circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Our review of the trial record leads to the
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient under Caraballo-Rodriguez.
II
Nwokedi also raises several challenges regarding the District Court’s willful
blindness jury instruction, despite the fact that the instruction was identical to the one the
parties “agreed[ ]upon” and “jointly submitted.” United States v. Nwokedi, 2016 WL

446 F.3d 458, 477 (3d Cir. 2006), and Nwokedi has failed to show that the destruction of
the heroin was not inadvertent or that the heroin would have been materially exculpatory,
see Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 545, 548 (2004). Furthermore, the purity of the
heroin was irrelevant to his sentence. United States v. Gori, 324 F.3d 234, 238–39 (3d
Cir. 2003); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(A).
3

7015626, at *9 & n.9 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2016). Under the invited error doctrine, then,
Nwokedi “waived his right to raise these instructional issues.” United States v. Ozcelik,
527 F.3d 88, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).
Even had Nwokedi objected to the willful blindness instruction, we would affirm.
Contrary to Nwokedi’s argument, the fact that he willingly accepted the package
containing heroin does not mean he was not willfully blind about its contents. Indeed, this
possibility was remarkably consistent with Nwokedi’s principal line of defense: that he
was unaware the package contained heroin. Nor did the willful blindness instruction
supplant the other elements of conspiracy, as Nwokedi asserts. It merely served as an
alternative to the knowledge element already described by the Court alongside the other
elements of conspiracy. See Supp. App. 382–92; United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634,
649–51 (3d Cir. 2006) (considering the instructions as a “whole”), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014).
The willful blindness instruction also did not “uproot[] the reasonable doubt
standard” or “shift[] the burden” of proof “onto Nwokedi.” Nwokedi Br. 32. The District
Court’s instructions were almost identical to the Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions,
which “d[o] not impose any burden, implicit or explicit, on [the defendant] to prove or
disprove his knowledge.” United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2014). Finally,
the willful blindness instruction did not constructively amend the indictment because it
did not “broaden[] the possible bases for conviction.” Salahuddin, 765 F.3d at 340. To
repeat, it merely described an alternative to the knowledge element. See United States v.
4

One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 813 (3d Cir. 1994). For these reasons, the willful
blindness instruction was not infirm.
*

*

*

For the reasons stated, we will affirm Nwokedi’s judgment of conviction.
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